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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 254(f) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that
states may adopt regulations "not inconsistent with" the Federal Commu-
nications Commission's (FCC or Commission) universal service regula-
tions.' After careful analysis of both the new federal universal service
regulations and developments in preemption law, this Article develops a
legal test for determining whether a state universal service program is in
whole or in part "inconsistent with" and thereby preempted by federal law.
Part II of the Article provides a brief overview of the history and
policy objectives of the Federal Universal Service Program. Part III pro-
vides a brief chronology of the jurisprudence surrounding federal preemp-
1. 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (Supp. 111996).
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tion of state regulations with a focus on cases dealing with FCC regula-
tions. By combining developed theories of preemption law with the sub-
stantive FCC universal service requirements, this Article develops a test
for determining whether a state universal service program is "not incon-
sistent with" the Federal Plan.
Part IV analyzes the Universal Service Program established by the
FCC pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act).
In Part V, the proposed test is applied to the Kansas and California univer-
sal service plans to determine if any portion of either state plan is pre-
empted. The states selected represent both urban and rural demographics in
state universal service regulation.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE
The goal of the Federal Universal Service Program is to extend tele-
communications services "to as many members of society as possible"
2
while providing the necessary funding to support the policy. Although
notions of universal service existed prior to the Communications Act of
1934 (1934 Act),3 the Act evidenced Congress's intent for all consumers to
receive telecommunications services at nondiscriminatory prices regard-
4less of the additional costs involved in providing service to rural areas.
Under the regulated monopoly regime that existed prior to the breakup of
AT&T, companies could internally generate funds to support their univer-
sal service responsibilities by cross-subsidizing-that is, using long-
distance revenues to amortize the fixed cost of building local service net-
works. After the divestiture of AT&T separated local and long-distance
service provision, carriers increasingly subsidized service in high-cost ru-
ral areas with revenues earned in low-cost urban areas and subsidized resi-
dential service with business service revenues. Long-distance continued to
subsidize local service through switched access charges that local ex-
change companies assessed on interexchange carriers.
The goal of the 1996 Act is to increase competition in the telecom-
munications industry at the local service level by removing regulatory bar-
riers to entry. However, promoting competition in local service is at odds
with the current method of funding universal service through cross-
subsidies. Because the most profitable services, such as business service,
attract the most new entrants, competition decreases the profit margin on
2. Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 955, 957 (1997).
3. See Mann-Eldns Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 539 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
4. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201-202 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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services typically used to subsidize universal service. As incumbents are
forced to sell their previously profitable services at more competitive
prices, their ability to cross-subsidize diminishes. In addition, new com-
petitive entrants are unable to compete in residential markets and high-cost
areas because, unlike the incumbent providers, they do not have a captive
customer base to subsidize the provision of such service. Congress at-
tempted to solve this inherent paradox between the goals of competition
and universal service by replacing cross-subsidies with explicit subsidies
from a universal service fund." The FCC's new universal service plan at-
tempts to transform implicit subsidies into explicit subsidies so that Con-
gress's goal of increasing competition in telecommunications is not
achieved at the expense of universal service.
With respect to intrastate service, traditionally, states have the re-
sponsibility to ensure that universal service is available at just, reasonable,
and affordable rates. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Con-
gress has given states significant responsibility to maintain universal serv-
•6
ice in a competitive environment. Specifically, section 254(f) of the Act
provides:
State authority
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the Commis-
sion's rules to preserve and advance universal service. Every tele-
communications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunications
services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,
in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and advance-
ment of universal service in that State. A State may adopt regulations
to provide for additional definitions and standards to preserve and ad-
5. Prior to the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC's im-
plementation orders, the Federal Universal Service Program was comprised of both explicit
and implicit support mechanisms. Explicit support mechanisms that provided subsidies di-
rectly to specific groups of subscribers include Lifeline Assistance, Link Up America, and
Telecommunications Relay Services programs. Additional explicit support mechanisms
provided support to local exchange carriers (LECs): the Universal Service Fund, the dial
equipment minutes weighting subsidy (DEM weighting), the Long Term Support program
(LTS), and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) loan programs. COMMON CARRIER BUREAU,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PREPARATION FOR ADDRESSING UNIVERSAL
SERVICE ISSUES: A REVIEW OF CURRENT INTERSTATE SUPPORT MECHANISMS, Feb. 23, 1996,
at 3. Additional explicit subsidies include: (1) the use of the carrier common line charge
(CCLC) to recover a portion of the non-traffic sensitive costs of the common line, (2) sub-
scriber line charges (SLCs), (3) study area rate averaging, and (4) the recovery of non-
traffic sensitive switching costs on a traffic sensitive basis and the interim transport rate
structure. Id. Implicit support mechanisms are difficult to identify because a monopoly re-
gime provides mismatches between cost and price and cross-subsidies. Implicit federal uni-
versal service support prior to the Act included inflated interstate access charges and busi-
ness and vertical services priced well above cost.
6. Phillip Rosario & Mark F. Kohler, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A State
Perspective, 29 CONN. L. REV. 331, 338-39 (1996).
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vance universal service within that State only to the extent that such
regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not rely
on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.
7
State commissions have authority to determine which carriers are eli-
gible to receive universal service support and are subject to universal
service obligations, to determine the service area for universal support to
nonrural carriers, and to determine when a carrier may be relieved of its
universal service obligations.8 Under the Act, states also may adopt sepa-
rate state universal service programs, provided that their rules are "not in-
consistent with" the FCC's universal service regulations and are supported
by "specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms... that do not rely on
or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms." 9 Section 254(f)
thus creates a delicate balance between encouraging states to adopt intra-
state universal service programs and ensuring that state programs do not
interfere with the federal universal service mechanism.
iII. A TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER STATE UNIVERSAL
SERVICE PLANS ARE "NOT INCONSISTENT WITH" SECTION
254(F) OF THE ACT
The following section details preemption law as it applies to section
254(f) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and develops a test for de-
termining whether state universal service regulations are "not inconsistent
with" the FCC's universal service rules. This section also provides an
overview of FCC preemption of state law.
A. Preemption
1. Preemption of State Law by Congress
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal
law is the supreme Law of the Land.'0 The doctrine of preemption derives
from the Supremacy Clause and provides that federal law will invalidate
state law in some instances." To conclude that a federal law has preemp-• 12
tive effect, there must be evidence of congressional intent. Such intent
7. 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (Supp. I 1996).
8. Id. § 214(e)(2)-(4).
9. Id. § 254(f).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. Marilyn R. Stahl, Note, Affordable Rates: The Case Against FCC Preemption of
Telephone Depreciation, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 517, 527 (1986) (citing W.LIAM B. LOCKHART
ET AL., CONSTuToNAL LAW 346 (5th ed. 1980)).
12. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
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may be determined by reviewing the history and language of the federal
law. 3 If state regulation of an area existed before the federal regulation,
there must be a clear showing of congressional intent to preempt. 14 Prop-
erly promulgated federal agency regulations that reflect congressional in-
tent have the same preemptive effect as federal laws. 5
Although commentators argue that preemption law cannot be reduced
to general formulas, the common law has defined at least two and possibly
three categories of preemption. 6 First, Congress preempts state regulation
by expressly providing for such preemption in a federal statute. 7 Second,
when express language of Congress's intent to preempt state law is absent
from federal law, Congress's intent to preempt state law may be inferred.
A court infers intent to preempt state law in two instances. First, pre-
emptive intent is inferred where Congress has legislated comprehensively
so as to occupy an entire field of regulation. 8 In these instances of "field
preemption," there is no room for a state to supplement federal law. Sec-
ond, a court may infer Congress's intent to preempt state law when state
law conflicts with federal law. This is known as "conflict preemption."
Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state
and federal law. ' Mere inconsistency with federal law is not sufficient to
warrant conflict preemption-the state law must substantially compromise
an important federal interest. Conflict preemption also occurs when a
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.'
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed two
issues integral to delineating the scope of federal preemption of state law.22
First, the opinion seemed to conclude that express preemptive language
precludes a conflict preemption analysis;23 however, in a later decision, the
(1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
13. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 232-36 (1947).
14. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984).
15. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986); Fidelity Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153; Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 856 F.2d 1558, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
16. LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTIrUTIoNAL LAW 479 (2d ed. 1988).
17. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983).
18. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 65 (1988).
19. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
20. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
21. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99
(1993) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)); see also Lou-
isiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986).
22. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
23. Id. at517.
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Court clarified that Cipollone does not preclude a conflict preemption
analysis where express preemption exists.24 Second, Cipollone provides
some indication of the level of intent required in the statutory language be-
fore express preemption occurs.25
In an attempt to define the interplay between express and conflict
preemption, the Court concluded that "Congress' enactment of a provision
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that
reach are not pre-empted. 26
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has in-
cluded in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of con-
gressional intent with respect to state authority.... there is no need to
infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive
provisions" of the legislation.
Although lower courts have interpreted Cipollone to preclude a con-
flict preemption analysis when express preemptive language exists,8 the
Supreme Court later clarified its position in a manner that rendered the
lower court interpretations moot. An express preemption clause merely
gives rise to a reasonable inference that no additional implied preemption
should be inferred.30
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute
"implies"--Le., supports a reasonable inference-that Congress did
not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express
clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption....
At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption
clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule.
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court required that express preemption
language provide "a reliable indicium of congressional intent. 32 As later
case law demonstrates, the "reliable indicium" standard is relatively sim-
24. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
25. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
26. Id. (restates the canon of statutory interpretation known as inclusio unius est exclu-
sio alterius).
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 620-21 (1997) (citing Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d
1416, 1420 (5th Cir. 1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (1st Cir. 1993);
Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 823 (1st Cir. 1992)).
29. Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. 280.
30. Id. at 288-89.
31. Id. (noting that Cipollone employed a conflict preemption analysis to make its de-
termination that the express language of the statute preempted the state tort law); see also
Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509, 571 (1996).
32. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (citation omitted).
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ple to satisfy. The Supreme Court's determination that statutory analysis
must begin and end with the plain wording of an express preemption
clause supports this inference." The treatment of the "indicium" require-
ment in Cipollone and lower court interpretation of this requirement estab-
lish a presumption that any express preemption clause is a "reliable indi-
cium of congressional intent.' ,14 According to the Eleventh Circuit, a
preemption clause could possess some ambiguity, yet constitute a "reliable
indicium of congressional intent."3 5 Despite the fact that the Supreme
Court clarified some aspects of the Cipollone decision in a later case, the
"reliable indicium" standard remains as a relaxed tool to measure statutory
language for preemptive effects.
2. Federal Agency Preemption of State Law: A Case Study of the
FCC's Preemptive Power
Properly promulgated federal agency regulations have the effect of
federal law for purposes of determining whether a state law is preempted."
Upon the grant of authority to promulgate rules, the agency's actions have
preemptive effect when state laws stand as an obstacle to the federal ob-
jective or when state laws cannot coexist with the federal rule. However, in
some cases Congress expressly limits a federal agency's power to preempt
state law. This Part describes the effect of such congressional limitation on
the preemptive power of FCC rules and orders.
The 1934 Act created a dual federal-state regulatory model for inter-
state and intrastate radio and wire communications.37 Section 1 of the 1934
Act created the FCC and granted it authority over "interstate and foreign
commerce in wire and radio communication."3 8 Section 2(b) limits FCC
jurisdiction by denying it power to regulate intrastate communications
service: "[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give
33. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).
34. Heiple v. C.R. Motors, Inc., 666 A.2d 1066, 1083 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that
none of its sister circuits that have considered the application of the Cipollone rule have
determined that an express preemption clause was not a reliable indicium), overruled by
Cellucci v. General Motors Corp., 676 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
35. Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1527 (lth Cir. 1994). The Supreme
Court did not take issue with the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. See Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
36. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986); Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 856 F.2d 1558, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
37. Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Under the 1996
Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2210, 2213 (1997).
38. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. II 1996)).
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the [FCC] jurisdiction with respect to... charges, classifications, prac-
tices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
• ,,39
communication service. Courts interpret section 2(b) to deny the FCC of
the commerce power to regulate based on intrastate communications serv-
ices' incidental effect on interstate commerce.4
In North Carolina Utility Commission v. FCC, the Fourth Circuit
fashioned a test to determine when the FCC may preempt state laws gov-
41
erning intrastate telecommunications services. The court determined that
the FCC is allowed to intrude into intrastate communications when it is
difficult to separate interstate components from intrastate components or
when the FCC is pursuing a policy objective important for the furtherance
of interstate communications.42 These negations of section 2(b) have be-
come known as the "impossibility exception." In dicta, the court noted that
rate making, unlike equipment, is an area where it is practical to separate
interstate from intrastate service.43
The Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive approach in Louisiana
Public Service Commission v. FCC.44 In Louisiana Public Service Com-
mission, the Court significantly restricted the ability of the FCC to preempt
state action involving jurisdictionally mixed services. 4' In determining
whether the FCC could preempt state depreciation rates for telephone
plants and equipment, the Supreme Court found that depreciation rates
46
were within the meaning of "charges" in section 2(b). The Court deter-
mined that it was possible to allocate the depreciation rates between the
interstate and intrastate jurisdictions, and as a result held that the state law
was not preempted.47
However, the Court stated that section 2(b) provides express juris-
dictional limitations: "By its terms, this provision fences off from FCC
reach or regulation intrastate matters-indeed, including matters 'in con-
nection with' intrastate service. ' 48 One commentator concluded that the
39. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title I, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994)); see also McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 2213.
40. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355.
41. North Carolina Util. Comm'n, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976).
42. Id. at 793. Other cases illustrating the preemptive nature of the Communications
Act of 1934 are Diamond Int'l Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding an
FCC decision not to preempt state tariffs) and Computer & Comm. Industry Ass'n v. FCC,
693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
43. North Carolina Util. Comm'n, 537 F.2d at 793 n.6.
44. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 355.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 373; McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 2217.
47. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 375-76.
48. Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
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Supreme Court "whittled down" the FCC's preemptive powers "to their
statutory base., 49 According to Louisiana Public Service Commission, FCC
jurisdiction over intrastate service only will be sustained in cases where it
is impossible to separate interstate from intrastate services and where the
state regulation will negate the FCC's lawful authority over interstate
communications.50 The FCC bears the burden of showing that the state
regulation would negate valid FCC regulatory goals.5'
In Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit used Louisiana
Public Service Commission reasoning to interpret the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. The court determined that the FCC could not preempt the
state's authority to set prices for intrastate services, rejecting the FCC's
argument that Louisiana Public Service Commission did not apply because
sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act constitute a specific, statutory dele-
gation of authority to the FCC by Congress. 53 Instead, the court found that
section 2(b) also requires that Congress be explicit when it seeks to pro-
vide the FCC with jurisdiction over intrastate matters: "Congress could
override section 2(b)'s command only by unambiguously granting the FCC
authority over intrastate telecommunications matters or by directly modi-
fying section 2(b)."54 With respect to pricing of local service, the court
held, Congress did not override section 2(b)'s command by unambigu-
ously granting the FCC authority over intrastate telecommunications mat-
ters or by directly modifying section 2(b) 5
The FCC's arguments in favor of preempting state pricing under sec-
tions 251 and 252 also failed the "impossibility exception" because the
separation rules provide a means to allocate between interstate and intra-
state jurisdictions, and the FCC did not show that state rate making would
56
negate FCC authority over interstate communications. Iowa Utilities
Board is relevant to whether section 2(b) applies to section 254(f) of the
Act because section 254 and sections 251 and 252 were added to the
Communications Act in 1996.
49. Michael J. Zpevak, FCC Preemption After Louisiana PSC, 45 FED. COMM. L.J.
185, 185-86 (1993).
50. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 375 n.4.
51. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 931 (9th Cir. 1994).
52. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 92-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568 (U.S. 1999).
53. Id. at 796; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms.
Act of 1996, Third Order on Reconsideration and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
12 F.C.C.R. 12,460, para. 2, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1206 (1997).
54. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 796 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 377 (1986)).
55. Id. (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 377).
56. Id. at 798.
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The Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional determination in Iowa
Utilities and instead concluded that the FCC had the authority to promul-
gate local competition rules regarding the prices for interconnection under
sections 251 and 252.57 Although the Supreme Court affirmed the use of
Louisiana PSC to interpret section 2(b),' 8 the Court held that the 1996 Act
has in effect extended the FCC's section 201(b) rulemaking authority to
cover purely intrastate matters in order to implement the Act's local com-
petition provisions.5 The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
the FCC's authority under sections 251 and 252 was limited by section
The Supreme Court's decision in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board does
not necessarily place section 254(f) beyond the reach of section 2(b)'s
limitation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's analysis implies that section
2(b) does not limit section 254(f). The Court noted that after the 1996 Act,
section 2(b) "may have less practical effect... because, Congress, by ex-
tending the Communications Act into local competition, has removed a
significant area from the States' exclusive control. 61 Although the Court
does not single out the universal service provisions of the 1996 Act, sec-
tion 254(f) fits the Court's description to the letter. In fact, the Supreme
Court's opinion implies that the entire 1996 Act is not limited by section
2(b) because it states that only "[i]nsofar as Congress has remained si-
lent... [section 2(b)] continues to function."62 The Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in AT&T v. Iowa regarding sections 251 and 252 strongly
suggests that section 2(b) does not limit federal power under the remaining
provisions of the 1996 Act, including section 254(f). However, the Court's
decision is not dispositive and the question still remains.
57. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 92-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568, at *15 (U.S.
1999).
58. Id. at *7 n.7 ('We discuss the Louisiana case because of the light it sheds upon the
meaning of [section 2(b)].").
59. Id. at *6. Section 201(b) provides "the [FCC] may prescribe such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act." 47
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). The Supreme Court's reliance on section 201(b) to override section
2(b)'s command is somewhat perplexing. Since section 201(b) is a general provision giving
the FCC power to promulgate rules as necessary, the section would then override section
2(b) in all instances where the Communications Act applies.
60. Id. at *6.
61. Id. at *7 n.8.
62. Id. Justice Thomas dissented on this point: "Nothing in the 1996 Act eliminates
[section] 2(b)'s fence. Congress has elsewhere demonstrated that it knows how to exempt
certain provisions from [section] 2(b)'s reach ..... Id. at *22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Thomas then refers to several instances where Congress modified the language of sec-
tion 2(b) to exclude certain provisions of the Communications Act. Id.
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In sum, there are several exceptions to section 2(b)'s limitation on the
FCC's power over the intrastate jurisdiction. First, Congress can override
section 2(b) by directly modifying it. Second, Congress can unambigu-
ously grant the FCC authority over intrastate communications. 4 In other
words, despite the limiting language of section 2(b), Congress can ex-
pressly provide the FCC with preemptive power over the intrastate juris-
diction anywhere in the Communications Act and the express language
will override section 2(b). Iowa Utilities Board provides several examples
of Congress directly granting the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate matters.
For instance, the Cable Act provides that "[t]he Commission shall, by
regulation, ensure that the rates for the basic service tier are reasonable."
65
Furthermore, section 276 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides
that the FCC is responsible for a compensation plan for intrastate pay
phones.66 Third, the "impossibility exception" provides that section 2(b)
can be negated when it is impossible to separate interstate and intrastate
components and when state laws conflict with the FCC's lawful authority
over the interstate jurisdiction.67 For all practical purposes, the
"impossibility exception" is the equivalent of the type of "conflict pre-
emption" that exists when state law stands as an obstacle to the objective
of a federal law.
B. Interpreting Section 254(f): Is It Express Preemption and Is It
Limited by Section 2(b)?
With regard to statutory interpretation of a section of the Communi-
cations Act, section 2(b) operates to limit the FCC's preemptive power
over state regulations governing intrastate services provided the section
does not meet one of the exceptions described above. By implication, sec-
tion 2(b) renders state laws governing "purely intrastate" services and
charges immune from FCC preemption. "Purely intrastate" refers to intra-
state "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations"
63. For instance, section 2(b) does not apply to sections 223-227 or section 332. See 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994). Congress modified section 2(b) to exclude section 332 from its
reach in 1993 in conjunction with obtaining authority for spectrum allocation via auction.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b)(3)(B)(i), 107
Stat. 396.
64. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 796 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds,
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 92-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568 (U.S. 1999) (citation
omitted).
65. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in relevant part in 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (1994)), cited in
Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 795 n.14.
66. 47 U.S.C. § 276(b) (Supp. II 1996), cited in Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 797.
67. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 931-33 (9th Cir. 1994).
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that are easily distinguishable from the interstate jurisdiction. Thus, if
section 2(b) applies to section 254(f), any test for determining state laws
"not inconsistent with" the FCC's rules must make allowances for purely
intrastate "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regula-
tions. ' 9 In other words, a state plan that affects purely intrastate "charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations" would survive
70
section 254(f)--even if inconsistent with the FCC's rules.
1. Plain Language
As discussed supra, the preemption inquiry begins with an examina-
tion of congressional intent. If Congress unambiguously grants the FCC
the power to regulate the intrastate jurisdiction at issue, express preemp-
tion exists and the state law is preempted . In cases where Congress's in-
tent is ambiguous, section 2(b) and the cases interpreting it determine
whether an FCC policy preempts state law. Therefore, it must first be de-
termined whether section 254(f) unambiguously grants the FCC the power
to preempt state laws that are inconsistent with its rules or whether section
2(b) limits its reach.
Section 254(f) of the Act provides:
State authority
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the Commis-
sion's rules to preserve and advance universal service. Every tele-
communications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunications
services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,
in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and advance-
ment of universal service in that State. A State may adopt regulations
to provide for additional definitions and standards to preserve and ad-
vance universal service within that State only to the extent that such
regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not rely
on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.
72
Section 254(f) creates three possible instances of preemption when:
(1) a state universal service plan is inconsistent with the Commission's
rules; (2) the law is not specific, predictable, and sufficient; and (3) the
state mechanism relies on or burdens the federal mechanism. Using a plain
language analysis, section 254(f) provides that states have authority to de-
sign a state universal service mechanism to which providers of intrastate
68. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 796 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 377 (1986)).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (Supp. II 1996).
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services contribute. However, according to the first sentence, state univer-
sal service mechanisms must not be "inconsistent with" the FCC's rules.
Hence, the "not inconsistent with" language is an unambiguous preemptive
clause that applies to everything contained in state plans, including the
portions of the plans that govern purely intrastate "charges, classifications,
practices, services, facilities, or regulations." Section 2(b) therefore does
not limit the preemptive effect of section 254(f).
2. Legislative History
The legislative history provides additional evidence that Congress
intended section 254(f) to preempt state plans that (at the very least) fail to
fulfill the federal minimum definition of universal service or do not con-
sistently comply with the requirement that all telecommunications carriers
contribute. 73 A conference report, the Senate version of which became the
1996 Act, provided:
[T]he Senate intends that States shall continue to have the primary role
in implementing universal service for intrastate services, so long as the
level of universal service provided by each State meets the minimum
definition of universal service established under new section 253(b)
and a State does not take any action inconsistent with the obligation
for all telecommunications carriers to contribute to the preservation
and advancement of universal service under new section 253(c).
74
Although the legislative history does not speak directly to the issue of
whether the language in section 254(f) renders section 2(b) inoperative, the
above passage clarifies that Congress was intervening in an area normally
governed by state law. Arguably then, because Congress was legislating in
an area traditionally governed by states, it intended to remove section
2(b)'s limitation on the preemptive effect of section 254(f).
3. Iowa Utilities Methodology
The Iowa Utilities method of preemption analysis also results in the
conclusion that section 254(f) should be given preemptive effect. Accord-
ing to the Eighth Circuit, which followed Louisiana PSC, a statute quali-
fies for an exception from section 2(b) if the statute unambiguously applies
to intrastate telecommunications matters and unambiguously directs theS• 75
FCC to implement its provisions. In Iowa Utilities, the court determined
that sections 251 and 252 did not meet this threshold, however, the plain
73. But see infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
74. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 128 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
139.
75. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 796, rev'd on other grounds, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., No. 92-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568 (U.S. 1999).
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language and substance of section 254(f) indicate that if the court was ap-
plying this analysis to section 254(f) instead of sections 251 and 252, a dif-
ferent conclusion would result. First, because universal service is com-
prised mostly of local telephone service, it is an "intrastate
telecommunications matter." Second, section 254(f) makes reference to the
fact that the FCC has the jurisdiction to implement the Federal Universal
Service Plan. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
ultimate conclusion, it affirmed the use of this line of reasoning in inter-
76preting section 2(b). Thus, according to the analysis employed
(notwithstanding the result reached) by the Eighth Circuit, section 2(b)
should not operate to limit section 254(f). This conclusion is bolstered by
the Supreme Court's holding that sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act are
not limited by section 2(b). Both the Eighth Circuit opinion and the recent
Supreme Court decision suggest that section 254 should be treated similar
to sections 251 and 252 for purposes of determining the scope of section
2(b).
4. FCC Interpretation
The FCC also has concluded that section 2(b) does not limit section
254. In affirming its ability to assess federal universal service contribu-
tions on intrastate carriers, the FCC interpreted section 254 to provide it
with jurisdiction over intrastate services for purposes of determining the
revenue base for the fund.7 Although the FCC did not single out section
254(f), it determined that it has jurisdiction to assess contributions on in-
trastate revenue and can require carriers to seek authority from states to re-
cover a portion of the contribution in intrastate rates.7
The FCC states that it derives this authority from the plain meaning
of section 254.79 Specifically, section 254 imposes the ultimate responsi-
bility for implementing the universal service program on the FCC. Fur-
thermore, section 254(c)(1) authorizes the FCC to define the parameters of
universal service.Y Finally, section 254(b)(5) requires the FCC to design a
mechanism that is "specific, predictable and sufficient."8
76. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 92-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568, at *7 n.7 (U.S.
1999).
77. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501, para. 202, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Report
to Congress].
78. Id.
79. Id. para. 203.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
81. Id. § 254(b)(5).
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These provisions indicate that the Commission has the primary re-
sponsibility and authority to ensure that universal service mechanisms are
"specific, predictable, and sufficient" to meet the statutory principle of
"just, reasonable, and affordable rates. 82 Arguably, if faced with the ques-
tion of whether the FCC is limited in its power to preempt inconsistent
state universal service policies, the FCC would provide the same statutory
argument.
With respect to section 2(b), the FCC states that "section 254 envi-
sions that the Commission would not be bound by the prior system of uni-
versal service mechanisms, which was based on the traditional jurisdic-
tional spheres."" Furthermore,
[Slection 254's express directive that universal service mechanisms be
"sufficient" ameliorates any section 2(b) concerns. As a rule of statu-
tory construction, section 2(b) only is implicated where the competing
statutory provision is ambiguous. As discussed above, section 254 un-
ambiguously establishes that the services to be supported have intra-
state as well as interstate characteristics and permits the Commission to
establish regulations implementing federal support mechanisms for the
supported intrastate services.
5. The Case for Section 2(b)'s Limitation on Section 254(f)
Based on the plain language of the statute, standard maxims of
statutory construction, and the FCC's interpretation of section 254 gener-
ally, it appears that section 254(f) provides express preemption unlimited
by section 2(b). However, there are several arguments to the contrary.
First, although Congress enumerated sections of the Communications Act
that are immune from section 2(b)'s reach, Congress did not include sec-
tion 254 among them. 5 For example, Congress, in passing the 1996 Act,
contemplated modifying section 2(b) to expressly exclude the local com-
petition provisions of the Act. These modifications of section 2(b) were
deleted by the Conference Committee in its final version of the Act.16 The
legislative history of section 254 does not indicate that Congress consid-
ered modifying section 2(b) to exclude section 254 from its reach.
82. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 77, para. 203.
83. Id. para. 208.
84. Id. para. 207 (citation omitted).
85. For instance, section 2(b) does not apply to sections 223 to 227 or section 332. See
47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994). This argument was used in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120
F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 92-
826 et al., 1999 WL 24568 (U.S. 1999).
86. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 797 n.17 (citing S. 652, 104th Cong. § 101(c)(2)
(1995); H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 101(e)(1) (1995)).
[Vol. 51
Number 2] STATE UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROGRAMS
Second, section 254(f) does not use the word "preemption." In sec-
tion 253, Congress expressly preempted any state law that acts as a barrier
to entry by using the word "preempt."' Because Congress invoked its ex-
press preemption power by using the word "preempt" in other portions of
the Act but not in section 254, 254(f) may not provide express preemption.
Finally, the language in section 254(f) arguably is not as clear as the lan-
guage in the Cable Act or the language in section 276, two provisions cited
by the Iowa Utilities court as examples of unambiguous direction by Con-
gress to the FCC to preempt state law."8
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth supports this alternative interpreta-
tion of section 254." Although he directed his comments to the FCC's
ability to fund the federal mechanism based, in part, on intrastate revenues
and did not speak to the issue of state universal service policies, he
strongly contends that section 254 does not extend the FCC's power be-
yond the limitations of section 2(b).90 "[S]ection 254, read in light of the
express directive of section 2(b), precludes the Commission from asserting
jurisdiction over revenues based on intrastate activities." 91 Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth reasons that the practice of allowing the FCC power to
calculate the contributions of intrastate carriers would "undermine the dual
scheme established in section 254 and, in any event, violate section 2(b)." 92
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth supports his interpretation with a
policy rationale: "The assertion of federal authority over intrastate reve-
nues impinges upon the states' ability to establish their own universal
service funds, which Congress expressly provided for in section 254(f)." 93
Furthermore, he reasons that since section 254(f) of the Act provides that
state plans cannot rely on or burden federal mechanisms, any state plan
that relies on intrastate revenues would violate the Act.94 However, the
Commissioner's argument reads the first sentence of section 254(f) out of
existence. According to section 2(b), states by default have jurisdiction
over intrastate "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations." Why would Congress need to restate that "states may adopt
[universal service] regulations not inconsistent with the Commission's
87. 47 U.S.C. § 253(d) (Supp. II 1996).
88. See supra notes 65-66.
89. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 77 (dissenting statement of
Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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rules" unless its purpose was to limit the state regulatory power beyond the
safeguards provided in section 2(b)?
Although Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's interpretation of section
254(f) may fail to recognize Congress's intent to preempt state universal
service regulations that are inconsistent with the Act, his position with re-
spect to the FCC's ability to base contributions on intrastate revenues may
be entirely accurate. Arguably, the express language of section 254(f)
takes the subsection beyond the reach of section 2(b). However, the re-
maining subsections of section 254 are subject to section 2(b)'s limitation.
6. Conclusion
Given statutory construction, FCC interpretation, and Supreme Court
jurisprudence, there is a substantial likelihood that a court would deter-
mine that section 254(f) expressly preempts conflicting state law. There-
fore, all state universal service policies are subject to preemption if they
violate the subsection's express language. In the alternative, if section 2(b)
limits section 254(f), the preemptive language of section 254 only applies
to state policies regarding jurisdictionally mixed services for which no
separation can be made between interstate and intrastate service. In other
words, the FCC may not force its will on state policies that deal exclu-
sively with intrastate issues. Although it is unlikely that a court will deter-
mine that section 2(b) limits section 254(f), the test provides an optional
prong that accounts for the section 2(b) factor.
C. A Three-Pronged Test for Determining Whether State Universal
Service Plans Are Preempted by Section 254(f)
1. Prong 1: Express Preemption
The first prong of the test is that a state plan must not be inconsistent
with the FCC's rules; must be specific, predictable, and sufficient; and
may not burden the federal mechanism. This prong is derived from an ex-
amination of section 254(f) in light of the case law on express preemption,
which is read to direct an express preemption analysis. The basic rule gov-
erning express preemption requires express preemption language to pro-
vide a "reliable indicium" of congressional intent.9" While express pre-
emption language gives rise to a reasonable inference that an implied
preemption analysis is inappropriate, it does not entirely foreclose the pos-
sibility.96
95. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (citation omitted).
96. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). Agency regulations
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Congress expressly prohibits state universal service program re-
quirements that (1) are "inconsistent with the Commission's rules to pre-
serve and advance universal service," (2) are not "specific, predictable, and
sufficient," or (3) burden the federal program.97 The "inconsistent with the
Commission's rules" clause could be interpreted in several ways. First, the
term "inconsistent" must be construed to determine whether it constitutes
express preemption. Congress's use of a "not inconsistent with" test in
section 254(f) suggests that a state need not adopt the exact same universal
service funding methodology as that selected by the FCC. Instead, this
language would appear to give states the flexibility to use various means to
achieve an end that preserves and enhances universal service.
A narrow interpretation would limit the scope of section 254(f) to in-
consistencies between a state plan and the FCC's rules as codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations. This approach excludes the preemption of
inconsistencies with the particulars of the FCC's implementation orders
98that establish and modify the FCC's universal service rules. The alterna-
tive approach is to define "rules" expansively, allowing the definition to
include all of the language in the FCC's implementation orders. Arguably,
the entire Federal Universal Service Plan is what Congress intended when
it referred to the Commission rules to preserve and advance universal
service.
However, consistency with the FCC's rules is not sufficient to protect
a state universal service regulation from federal preemption. Although
section 254(f)'s requirement that universal service support be specific,
predictable, and sufficient is included among the design principles listed in
the FCC's implementing regulations, 9 the restriction on burdening the
Federal Plan is not.
2. Prong 2: Conflict Preemption
The second prong of the test requires a simple conflict preemption
analysis in addition to the express preemption analysis required in prong 1.
Consistency with the FCC's rules is not sufficient to ensure that a state
universal service plan is not preempted by the Act. A state plan could be
technically "not inconsistent with" the Commission's rules and not burden
the federal program, yet fail a "conflict preemption" test. This form of pre-
may have the effect of federal law for preemptive purposes, but Congress must explicitly
override section 2(b). Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (Supp. II 1996).
98. A description of these rules can be found in Part IV infra.
99. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776,
para. 44, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Report and Order].
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emption is contemplated by the analysis in Freightliner Corp., which held
that the Cipollone case "supports an inference that an express pre-emption
clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule."'
Therefore, if the express preemption clause contains more than "some"
ambiguity,'0 ' conflict preemption analysis is warranted.
Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with
state and federal law simultaneously or when a state law obstructs an im-S 102
portant objective of federal regulation. The first prong of the express
preemption test under section 254(f) makes a separate inquiry into the sec-
ond type of conflict preemption (the obstruction of federal objectives) du-
plicative because any state universal service plan consistent with FCC de-
sign principles would comply with the objectives of the Act.
However, a state plan will have to meet the additional requirement
that all of its parts must coexist with the federal mechanism. In particular,
state plans that include requirements "in addition to" the federal mecha-
nism should almost always pass this prong of the test if they preserve and
enhance universal service. Only if a state adopts universal service regula-
tions "in addition to" the policies adopted by the FCC that are not for the
purpose of enhancing and preserving universal service, or if a state decides
a particular issue differently from the Federal Universal Service Plan, will
the conflict preemption requirement pose a significant barrier to a state
universal service regulation.
3. Prong 3: (Optional) Exclusion of Purely Intrastate Services
The optional third prong of the test requires that regulations govern-
ing equipment used exclusively in the intrastate jurisdiction, services pro-
vided exclusively in the intrastate jurisdiction, or charges for intrastate
services are immune, pursuant to section 2(b), from the preemptive reach
of section 254(f), even if inconsistent with the federal program. As dis-
cussed above, if section 2(b) is held to limit the preemptive authority of
section 254(f), the classification of a state law or regulation as either com-
pletely interstate, completely intrastate, or jurisdictionally mixed further
affects the preemptive effect of section 254(f). Acknowledging this dis-
tinction preserves section 2(b)'s limitation on FCC power over intrastate
services.
100. Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 288-89 (discussing Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504).
101. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
102. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(citation omitted).
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4. Conclusion
To determine whether a state universal service plan is inconsistent
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a state plan must not be incon-
sistent with the FCC's rules (including the requirement that the plan be
specific, predictable, and sufficient), must not burden the federal mecha-
nism (prong 1), and must be able to coexist with each policy adopted by
the Federal Universal Service Plan (prong 2). Additionally, if section 254
is held to be limited by section 2(b), state-laws concerning purely intrastate
services, equipment, and charges are immune from FCC preemption.
IV. THE FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE PLAN PURSUANT TO
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
This section describes the "rules," collectively known as the Federal
Universal Service Plan (Federal Plan), that the FCC adopted in a Report
and Order entitled Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service
(Universal Service Report and Order) to implement the universal service
provisions of the 1996 Act.'03 The FCC developed the Federal Plan in re-
sponse to Congress's mandate of a new universal service plan, which con-
stitutes the "Commission's rules to preserve and advance universal serv-
ice" referred to in section 254(f).
The Federal Plan establishes seven universal service design princi-
ples: (1) "[q]uality services should be available at just, reasonable, and af-
fordable rates"; (2) "[a]ccess to advanced telecommunications and infor-
mation services should be provided in all regions of the Nation"; (3)
"[c]onsumers in all regions of the Nation... should have access to tele-
communications and information services, including interexchange serv-
ices and advanced ... services, that are reasonably comparable [in sub-
stance and price] to those services provided in urban areas"; (4) "[a]U
providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable and
nondiscriminatory contribution to . . .universal service"; (5) "It]here
should be specific, predictable, and sufficient Federal and State mecha-
nisms to preserve and advance universal service"; (6) "[e]lementary and
secondary schools and classrooms, health care providers, and libraries
should have access to advanced telecommunications services"; and (7)
universal support mechanisms should be competitively neutral.'0
4
The Federal Plan also defines the basic universal services supported
by the federal universal service program. These services include "single-
party service; voice grade access to the public switched network; DTMF
103. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99.
104. Id. paras. 44-45 (citation omitted).
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signaling or its functional equivalent; access to emergency services; access
to operator services; access to interexchange service; access to directory
assistance; and toll limitation services for qualifying low-income consum-
ers."'
10 5
The Federal Plan also specifies which carriers are eligible to receive
universal service support; only a common carrier may be eligible to re-
ceive universal service support. 106 Each eligible carrier must offer the
services supported by the Federal Universal Service Plan and must do so
"using its own facilities or a combination of its own facilities and resale of
another carrier's services." 07 Carriers are required to advertise the avail-
ability and charges associated with supported services. 10 '
The Universal Service Report and Order implementing the Federal
Plan also provides nonrural and rural service area definitions. It requires
that states exercise their authority in designating nonrural service areas "in
a manner that promotes the pro-competitive goals of the 1996 Act as well
as the universal service principles of section 254."'10 The FCC concluded
that service areas should be "sufficiently small to ensure accurate targeting
of high-cost support" and should encourage competition."" With respect to
rural service areas, the FCC retained the pre-Act study areas of rural tele-
phone companies; however, the FCC encourages states to consider the an-
ticompetitive impacts of noncontiguous service areas."'
The Federal Plan establishes four separate universal service pro-
grams: (1) high-cost support; (2) low-income support; (3) educational pro-
vider support; and (4) rural health care support. The Federal Plan provides
that the FCC will use forward-looking cost study methodologies to deter-
mine universal support levels. The new high-cost program provides differ-
ent implementation timelines for rural and nonrural carriers. Nonrural
carriers are expected to convert to a forward-looking economic cost basis
by 1999, while rural carriers remain on an embedded cost basis for at least
three years from the date of the Order."3
The federal high-cost program will operate in the following manner.
The FCC will set a revenue benchmark that represents the average revenue
per line, per month collected by incumbent local exchange carriers
105. Id. para. 61.
106. Id. para. 134.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. para. 184.
110. Id.
111. Id. para. 190.
112. Id. para. 222.
113. Id. paras. 245, 273, 294.
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(ILECs). Universal service support will equal the difference between the
federal benchmark and a carrier's forward-looking cost of providing basic
universal service. The FCC will apply federal universal service support to
a carrier's revenues in the interstate jurisdiction to reduce the carrier's in-
terstate access charges.'1
Local service, access, and discretionary revenues are included in the
FCC's revenue benchmark." 5 The FCC adopted a temporary benchmark of
$31 for residential lines and $51 for single-line businesses; universal serv-
ice support will be provided for all lines. 116 Initially, the FCC determined
that the Federal Universal Service Fund would support 25 percent of the
difference between the benchmarks and the economic cost of providing
service.17 The remaining 75 percent of the difference between the cost of
providing service and the revenue benchmark was to be funded by the
states."' In the FCC's Report to Congress (Universal Service Report to
Congress), the FCC announced that it was reconsidering its decision to
allocate 75 percent of the universal service program funding to the
states." 9
The Federal Plan provides states with the opportunity to develop their
own cost-proxy models for determining the state contribution amount.120
States that do not elect to use their own cost-proxy model to determine
distributions will use the FCC's cost-proxy model. The FCC was sched-
uled to select a cost-proxy model platform by the end of 1997, and a final
model by August 1998; however, this schedule was delayed. ' 2 On October
28, 1998, the FCC rejected two industry-proposed models and instead
114. Id. para. 381.
115. Id. para. 267.
116. Id. paras. 267,275,296.
117. Id. para. 269.
118. The FCC reasons that state universal service support has, in the past, been substan-
tial. Furthermore, the FCC notes that it does not have any authority over the local rate-
setting process or implicit subsidies inherent in local rates. Accordingly, the FCC decided
not to substitute explicit federal support for implicit intrastate universal service support. See
id. para. 271.
119. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 77, paras. 230-31. The FCC is cur-
rently considering a recommendation of the Federal-State Joint Board to modify the separa-
tions rules. See Common Carrier Bureau Seeks Comment on Universal Service Joint
Board's Second Recommended Decision, CC Docket No. 96-45, Public Notice, 1998 FCC
LEXIS 6037 (Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Public Notice]; Federal-State
Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Second Recommended Decision, 1998 FCC LEXIS 6027
(Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Second Recommended Decision].
120. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 248.
121. Id. para. 245.
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adopted a hybrid cost model combining components of the industry mod-
els with the FCC's in-house model. 122
The FCC decided to continue the Lifeline and Link Up America pro-
123grams with some minor adjustments. The Lifeline program was ex-
panded to include all eligible telecommunications providers, and all eligi-
ble carriers are required to offer Lifeline to qualified customers. 124 The
extension of Lifeline is consistent with the requirement that universal
service be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The FCC decided to no
longer tie Lifeline support to the subscriber line charge (SLC). Instead,
Lifeline recipients will receive $5.25 of federal support.'25 In addition to
the $5.25 in federal support, the federal program will match one-half of
any state support up to $1.75. 126 If a state provides a $3.50 contribution,
Lifeline recipients will receive $10.50, with the limitation that the total
Lifeline support is not to exceed the Lifeline rate. 127 The only change in the
Link Up America program is its expansion to include all eligible telecom-
munications carriers. Link-up carriers may recover from the Universal
Service Fund based on foregone revenues.129 Although not detailed here,
the FCC places additional restrictions on carriers participating in either
low-income program. "0
122. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Fifth Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
21,323, para. 3 (1998). The FCC required states that did not want to use the FCC model to
submit an alternative for FCC review. Although the FCC required that states submit cost
models by April 28, 1998, Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
20,255 (1997), the FCC did not select the federal model platform until the release of the
Fifth Report and Order in November 1998. Because most states that submitted a state
model to the FCC adopted one of the two industry models, all of these states now have a
cost model that differs substantially from the federal model. This result supports the conclu-
sion that consistency with the FCC's rules does not require that state universal service plans
exactly mirror the Federal Plan.
123. Both the Lifeline and Link Up America programs are managed by the states to pro-
vide benefits to low-income or elderly telephone subscribers. COMMON CARRIER BuREAu,
supra note 5, at 3. The FCC adopted Lifeline plans in 1984 and 1985 that reduced an eligi-
ble subscriber's monthly telephone bill. The 1984 plan provided a 50% waiver of the sub-
scriber line charge (SLC), and participating states matched this amount with an explicit sub-
sidy. The 1985 plan completely waived the SLC, and participating states provided an
amount equal to the SLC in subsidy support. The Link Up America program provides for
half of the first $60 of connection charges and the interest on the balance (in cases where
LECs have deferred payment plans).
124. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 346; 47 C.F.R. § 54.405
(1998).
125. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 351.
126. Id. para. 352.
127. Id. para. 353 n.891.
128. Id. para. 380.
129. Id. para. 379 n.956.
130. See id. paras. 384-85, 390, 393, 398.
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All eligible schools and libraries will receive discounts of between 20
and 90 percent of the cost of telecommunications services, Internet serv-
ices, and internal connections provided by telecommunications providers.
However, the total federal support for the schools and libraries program is
limited to $2.25 billion.13 In an effort to foster competition, the FCC ex-
tended the schools and libraries program to non-telecommunications carri-
ers.132 Schools and libraries have "maximum flexibility" to determine the
package of services they believe best meets their needs. The program of-
fers greater support to eligible schools and libraries in high-cost and eco-
nomically depressed areas. 1 The FCC provides guidelines for determining
which beneficiaries are economically disadvantaged. The FCC developed a
discount matrix providing the appropriate rates for all eligible beneficiar-
ies. Schools and libraries are required to self-certify to ensure that only
eligible entities receive funds and that these entities have adopted plans se-
curing efficient access to and use of all services purchased from telecom-
136
munications and non-telecommunications carriers.
Funding for the schools and libraries program is derived from a
broader base than funding for the high-cost and other universal service
programs. Contributions for schools and libraries will be based on inter-
state and intrastate revenues, while funding for the other universal service
programs is based solely on interstate revenues.1 37 The FCC takes the posi-
tion that it has the authority to base contributions for all universal service
programs on both interstate and intrastate revenues. As discussed supra,
one FCC Commissioner disagrees that the FCC has such authority.
3 1
The Rural Health Care program extends to all public and nonprofit
care providers that are both located in rural areas and meet the statutory
definition of "health care provider. 1 39 The program supports telecommu-
nications services that are both necessary for the provision of health care
and have a bandwidth of 1.544 Mpbs or less. ' 4 Telecommunications serv-
ice providers are restricted from charging health care providers any rate
higher than the highest tariffed or publicly available rate charged by a car-
131. Id. para. 425.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. para. 494.
135. See id. para. 498.
136. Id. paras. 522-25.
137. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 77, paras. 199-200.
138. Id. (dissenting statement of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
139. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 608; see 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(5)(B) (Supp. I 1996) for the statutory definition of eligible health care providers.
140. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 608.
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tier to a commercial customer for a similar service in the state's closest
city with a population of more than 50,000 (taking long-distance charges
into account). Carriers providing service under the program may recover
the difference "between the rate for similar services provided to other
customers in comparable rural areas... and the [actual] rate charged to the
rural health care provider."'4 2 The program provides limited support to all
health care providers for toll-free access to an Internet service provider.
The support for the health care program is subject to a $400 million cap.141
The FCC also altered the long-term support program and the access
charge structure to make them consistent with the 1996 Act.1" The FCC
removed long-term support from the interstate access charge system be-
cause it was inconsistent with the Act's requirement that contributions "be
equitable and nondiscriminatory, and available to all eligible telecommu-
nications carriers."1 45 Instead, the higher-than-average subscriber line costs
(SLCs) will be recovered on a per-line basis through new federal universal
support mechanisms. 4 The FCC decided not to raise the SLC cap "for
primary residential and single-line business lines."' 47 Instead, the FCC
"create[d] and implemente[d] a system of flat, per-line charges on" pre-
subscribed interexchange carriers to replace the carrier common line
charge (CCLC). 1
48
Contributions to the Universal Service Fund are to be made by all
telecommunications providers. These contributions are to be based on re-
tail, end-user telecommunications revenue. 149 Wholesale revenues billed to
other carriers and resellers are excluded from the calculation."50 The inter-
state share of the universal service contribution amount must come from
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The long-term support (LTS) program supports LECs with higher than average
subscriber line costs. COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, supra note 5, at 5. These high-cost LECs
recover the full interstate portion of their subscriber line costs through a nationwide average
common line interstate access rate charge on IXCs (long-distance providers). Long-term
support is provided though pooling arrangements; individual LTS payments equal the dif-
ference between a pool member's actual costs and the rates charged to IXCs. Local ex-
change carriers outside the pool fund LTS by charging above interstate costs.
145. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 751.
146. Id.
147. Id. para. 752.
148. Id. para. 768; Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982,
para. 71, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997).
149. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 843.
150. Id. para. 848.
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interstate operations. 51 Carriers are allowed to pass through the contribu-
tion amount to interstate customers.
152
Although the Universal Service Report and Order provided for many
changes in the Federal Plan, it is by no means the end of the inquiry. The
Universal Service Report and Order is currently being reviewed by the
Fifth Circuit. I" Furthermore, subsequent FCC orders clarified and adjusted
the Federal Plan. The Universal Service Fourth Order on Reconsideration
clarified that high-cost loop support, dial equipment minutes (DEM)
weighting assistance,' 54 and Long Term Support (LTS) are to be removed
from interstate access charges and instead recovered from the new univer-
sal service support system.155 Pursuant to the Fourth Order on Reconsid-
eration, rural local exchange carriers (LECs) receive modified high-cost
156loop fund support, DEM weighting program support, and LTS. Non-
rural LECs receive support from the modified high-cost fund and LTS
programs and will continue to receive this support until they transition to
forward-looking methodologies in 1999. ' 57
In addition to the Fifth Circuit review of the Federal Universal Serv-
ice Plan and the FCC's subsequent orders,' 58 interested parties are using the
political process in an attempt to further modify the Federal Plan. In No-
vember 1997, Joel Shifman and Thomas Welch of the Maine Public Utili-
ties Commission presented a paper produced by an ad hoc staff group that
proposes an alternative to the FCC's high-cost distribution mechanism.'59
The proposal was prepared at the request of the Chairman of the Commu-
151. Id. paras. 825-26.
152. Id. para. 829.
153. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, No. 97-60421 (5th Cir. 1997).
154. The DEM weighting subsidy, established prior to the 1996 Act, is based on the
premise that smaller telephone companies realize higher local switching costs per line be-
cause smaller companies are unable to realize economies of scale. As a result, the DEM
weighting rules allow small companies to recover local switching costs through interstate
traffic. COMMON CARRIER BuREAu, supra note 5, at 5. The separations rules allocate local
switching equipment costs between the interstate and intrastate jurisdictions based on the
jurisdiction's relative number of dial equipment minutes of use (DEM). Local exchange
carriers with fewer than 50,000 lines are allowed to allocate an additional amount of local
switching costs, determined by weighting the interstate minutes of use, to the interstate ju-
risdiction. DEM weighting is funded by the entities that pay switched access charges, IXCs
and their customers.
155. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Fourth Order on Reconsideration, 13
F.C.C.R. 5318, para. 26, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1282 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Serv.
Fourth Order on Reconsideration].
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, No. 97-60421 (5th Cir. 1997).
159. Joel Shifman et al., High Cost Support Proposal, Nov. 3, 1997 (submitted ex parte
to the FCC in Docket No. 96-45, Nov. 18, 1997).
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nications Committee of the National Association of Regulatory Commis-
sioners (NARUC). The proposal allows the FCC to meet its statutory obli-
gation to provide sufficient support for high-cost areas but limits federal
funding to cases in which it would be impossible for a state to internally
generate enough support to ensure that rates in rural areas in the state are
reasonably comparable to average urban rates in the nation.'
60
The Shifman proposal's focus on minimizing the federal universal
service fund may not be misplaced. The proposal increases speculation
about the inequities that may result from a federal program that treats all
states the same, regardless of urban/rural demographics. More importantly,
the proposal evidences the fact that the FCC's universal service rules may
be modified by Congress, the FCC, or the courts before the publication of
this Article.
For example, on April 10, 1998, the FCC released a Report to Con-
gress. The Report affirmed the majority of the FCC's decisions regard-
ing the implementation of section 254 of the Act, as well as indicated that
it will reconsider certain aspects of the new universal service plan. First,
the FCC affirmed its policies regarding: (1) the definition of information
service; (2) the application of its definition of information service; (3) the
broad class of carriers required to contribute to universal service; (4) the
class of carriers eligible to receive universal support; and (5) the FCC's
ability to require contributions based on intrastate revenues.16 However,
the FCC decided to reconsider its allocation of 75 percent of the cost of the
universal service program to the state jurisdiction. The FCC concluded that
"a strict, across-the-board rule that provides 25 percent of unseparated
high-cost support to the larger LECs might provide some states with less
total interstate universal service support than is currently provided ... ,, "
63
The FCC's position on these issues evidences its serious consideration of
the concerns described in the Shifman proposal'
The FCC's Report also touched on its authority over state universal
service plans. With regard to the assessment and recovery of universal
support mechanisms, section 254 provides the FCC with jurisdiction to as-
sess contributions for universal service support mechanisms from intra-
state revenues. This conclusion is relevant because, as discussed in detail
160. Id. at 1.
161. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 77.
162. See generally id.
163. Id. para. 197.
164. As discussed, the FCC is currently soliciting comment on the Joint Board's Second
Recommended Decision. The decision adopted some of the proposed modifications in-
cluded in the Shifman proposal. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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supra, the FCC does not automatically have jurisdiction over intrastate
revenues and services.' 6 Currently, this issue is the subject of pending pe-
titions for reconsideration and will be addressed in a forthcoming FCC Or-
der.166
V. KANSAS AND CALIFORNIA: CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO
PROVIDING UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THEIR ADEQUACY
UNDER THE SECTION 254(F) TEST
A. Kansas
1. The Kansas Universal Service Plan
The Kansas Universal Service Plan (Kansas Plan), currently the sub-
ject of a pending FCC proceeding, has in the past been the subject of scru-
tiny by both federal and state courts reviewing whether it is "consistent"
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Kansas Court of Appeals
determined that portions of Kansas's Universal Service Plan were incon-
sistent with both the 1996 Act and the Kansas Act and remanded these
provisions to the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC).' 67 However, the
Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld most of
the Kansas Plan as originally adopted by the KCC.16' A federal challenge
to the Kansas Plan by wireless carriers was dismissed by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas in July 1998.'69 In August 1998, the FCC
sought comment on the Kansas Universal Service Plan in response to a
petition filed by Western Wireless requesting preemption of the Kansas
Plan.170
165. See generally Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994).
166. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 77, para. 209.
167. Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 943 P.2d 494 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1997). The Kansas Act is codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-2001 to 2008 (Supp.
1998).
168. Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 956 P.2d 685, 700
(Kan. 1998).
169. On July 24, 1998, the Federal District Court of Kansas dismissed Sprint Spectrum
v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, 149 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998), at the request
of the complaining parties. The parties challenged the KCC's assessment of universal serv-
ice contributions on wireless carriers. Some counts were dismissed with prejudice. Previous
to the dismissal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a denial of a preliminary in-
junction from the universal service contribution requirement requested by the complainants
on the ground that "there is not a substantial likelihood that the wireless providers will suc-
ceed on their preemption claim." Id. at 1059. Wireless issues aside, the Kansas Universal
Service Plan is arguably inconsistent with the 1996 Act in many respects.
170. Commission Seeks Comment on Western Wireless Petition for Preemption of Stat-
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The Kansas Universal Service Plan was created pursuant to the Kan-
sas Act, adopted on July 1, 1996. 171 The Kansas Act mandated reform of
the state access charge system in the form of a rate rebalancing. Because
Kansas's intrastate access charges were higher than the FCC's interstate
access charges, the Kansas legislature mandated that the KCC rebalance
rates to align intrastate access charges with federal access charges. The
statute created the Kansas Universal Service Fund (KUSF), initially com-
prised of LEC revenues lost as a result of access charge rate rebalancing
over a three-year period.
172
The Kansas Act requires all telecommunications carriers, including
wireless, providing intrastate services to contribute to the KUSF on an eq-
uitable and nondiscriminatory basis. 73 The Kansas Act was later amended
to relieve wireless carriers from contributions based on the portion of their
intrastate revenue derived from services provided exclusively over a wire-
less network.' 74 By statute, carriers are permitted to pass through contribu-
tions to their customers. 175 Carriers can request supplemental funding from
the KUSF based on additional lines. Payments from the KUSF were
scheduled to begin March 1, 1997. The KUSF administrator was to be se-
lected through a competitive bidding process. 76 State law also requires
LECs to offer Internet services to those locations where 14.4 Kpbs trans-
mission is not available.
77
The KCC adopted an Order implementing the Kansas Plan on De-
cember 27, 1996.178 The Order implements the statutory requirement that
state universal service support be provided from the KUSF on a revenue-
neutral basis. 179 This means that incumbent carriers would be entitled to
recover the decline in their intrastate access charge revenues from the
KUSF. The KUSF is funded by an equal assessment on all intrastate retail
revenues.,80 In 1997, the KCC estimated that the surcharge will reach 14.1
percent at the end of 1999, and the initial KUSF would be $111.6 million,
utes and Rules Regarding Kansas State Universal Service Fund, Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R.
14,049 (1998).
171. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-2002(h) (Supp. 1998).
172. Id. § 66-2008(a).
173. Id. § 66-2008(b).
174. 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 138 (S.B. 212).
175. In April of 1998, the Kansas legislature modified the pass-through requirements. Id.
176. The National Exchange Carrier Association is the current administrator of the Kan-
sas Universal Service Fund.
177. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-2011.
178. General Investigation into Competition Within the Telecommunications Industry in
the State of Kansas, Order (Dec. 27, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 KCC Order].
179. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-2005(c), 66-2008(a).
180. Id. § 66-2008(b).
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which is equivalent to the reduction in intrastate toll and access rates over
a three-year phase-in period. LECs are permitted to offset payments to
the KUSF with expected distributions. Competitive local exchange carriers
will be responsible for the KUSF assessment related to resold or unbun-
dled services.
Unlike the Federal Plan, which makes support available to all carri-
ers, in Kansas, ALECs are only eligible to receive state universal service
support for their exchange areas with less than 10,000 access lines."' The
ALEC support is paid at a rate of $36.88 per line. The KUSF only supports
residential lines.'4
Several requirements of the Kansas Act and the KCC Order were
contested in federal and state court. First, in federal district court wireless
carriers challenged the Kansas Act's requirement that they contribute to
the KUSF.'15 The challengers argued that the contribution requirement
regulated wireless carriers without proper authority. The Federal District
Court of Kansas concluded that this provision does not conflict with 47
U.S.C. section 332(c)(3)(A). The federal court stated that the KUSF
contribution imposed by the KCC was not a regulation of rates or market
entry, but was simply "an additional cost of doing business."' 87
Second, a citizen's group contested in state court the Kansas Act and
KCC Order's revenue-neutrality requirements as inconsistent with section
254(b)(4), (b)(5), (f), and (i) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996."'
The plaintiffs also argued that the Kansas Act prevented the KCC from
performing its regulatory responsibilities, both in general and, in particu-
lar, in its responsibility to insure that carriers complied with section
254(k). 18 (Section 254(k) requires that states ensure that services related to
universal service "bear no more than a reasonable share of the joint and
181. 1996 KCC Order, supra note 178, para. 112.
182. ALECs are competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).
183. 1996 KCC Order, supra note 178, para. 123.
184. Id. para. 125.
185. Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 966 F. Supp. 1043, 1048
(D. Kan. 1997).
186. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994).
187. Mountain Solutions, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1048. This issue was subsequently ad-
dressed and resolved in the FCC's Universal Serv. Fourth Order on Reconsideration, supra
note 155, para. 262. See also Petition of Pittencrieff Comm., Inc. for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Preemption of the Texas Pub. Util. Regulatory Act of 1995, 13 F.C.C.R. 1735,
para. 13, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041 (1997).
188. Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 943 P.2d 494, 506
(Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
189. Id.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
common costs of facilities used to provide those services."'' 9 ) The latter
contention was based on the fact that the KCC did not investigate ILEC
cost of providing local service and instead arbitrarily adopted the $111.6
million figure.191 The Kansas Appeals Court, which was subsequently
overturned, held:
The result is a final order that fully protects incumbent LECs by shift-
ing lost revenues from one corporate pocket to another while requiring
all other providers and consumers to bear the financial burden of
"revenue neutral" regulation. The funding methodology also precludes
meaningful review of whether LECs are using services that are not
competitive to subsidize services that are subject to competition. Fi-
nally, the KCC order has created a $111.6 million fund that bears no
rational relation to the concept of universal service and its cost.192
The Kansas Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the KCC
with instructions to make the Order consistent with section 254(f), (i), and
(k). 93 The court also remanded the issue of whether it is competitively
neutral for wireless carriers to subsidize ILECs through the KUSF. 94 The
court determined that the KCC's allocation of 100 percent of the loop costs
to the intrastate jurisdiction was inconsistent with section 254(k) of the
Act. 1 5 Because approximately 75 percent of loop costs can be attributed to
the cost of providing local service, the KCC was ordered to ensure reason-
able apportionment on remand.
196
Most of the Kansas Court of Appeals decision was reversed by the
Kansas Supreme Court: "We hold the revenue neutral concept is not pro-
hibited by or contrary to the Federal Act. When Kansas passed the Act in
question, there were no federal regulations in place. We do not have before
us the federal regulations concerning the Federal Act. 1 97 As a result, the
court held that the Kansas Act does not conflict with the KCC's statutory
duty to regulate and ensure just and reasonable rates and charges to con-
190. 47 U.S.C. § 254(k) (Supp. II 1996).
191. Citizens' Util. RatepayerBd., 943 P.2d at 507.
192. Id. at 506-07. Competitive neutrality is at the heart of testing state universal service
plans against the requirements of the 1996 Act. Section 254 requires that universal service
support be provided on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis. The FCC adopted com-
petitive neutrality as a universal service design principle in its Order implementing the uni-
versal service provisions of the Act. Universal service provisions are competitively neutral
if they "neither unfairly advantage or disadvantage one provider over another." Universal
Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 47.
193. Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd., 943 P.2d at 507.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 507-08.
197. Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 956 P.2d 685, 700
(Kan. 1998).
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sumers. 198 Finally, with regard to the challenge of requiring wireless carri-
ers to contribute to the KUSF, the court relied on the FCC determination
that "section 332(c)(3) does not preclude states from requiring CMRS pro-
viders to contribute to state support mechanisms.' 99 The court concluded
that the law denying the KCC jurisdiction over wireless carriers did not
conflict with the provision assessing KUSF contributions on wireless car-
riers.
Litigants have also asked the FCC to determine the validity of Kan-
sas's Universal Service Plan. On July 20, 1998, Western Wireless peti-
tioned the FCC to preempt the Kansas Plan.200 Western Wireless argued
that the Kansas Plan should be preempted under section 253 because it
creates a barrier to entry for competitive carriers. According to Western
Wireless, the Kansas Plan bars entry in two ways. First, the Kansas Plan
favors ILECs by guaranteeing them revenue neutrality during the KCC's
reform of access charges. 201 Second, the Kansas Plan is not competitively
neutral because it denies statewide universal service support to CLECs,
202
while it provides statewide support to incumbents.
In addition, Western Wireless argues that the Kansas Plan is incon-
sistent with section 254(f) because the standards and definitions adopted in
• • 203
Kansas are not targeted to enhance and preserve universal service. Ac-
cording to Western Wireless, the Kansas Plan is also inconsistent with
section 254 for the following reasons: (1) the Kansas Plan does not ensure
that consumers in rural or high-cost areas have reasonably priced access to
telecommunications services pursuant to section 254(b)(3); (2) the KUSF
is not equitable, nondiscriminatory, and targeted to preserve and enhance
universal service as required by section 254(b)(4) and 254(d); (3) the Kan-
sas Plan does not ensure that carriers use KUSF support for the provision,
maintenance, and upgrading of the facilities used to provide basic service;
(4) the Kansas Plan has no reasonable relationship to ensuring just, reason-
able, and affordable rates under 254(i); and (5) the Kansas Plan fails to
prevent cross-subsidization between competitive and noncompetitive
services under 254(k).204
The KCC filed comments in response to Western Wireless's Petition
for Preemption. Most notably, the KCC argued, "unlike [s]ection 253(a),
198. Id.
199. Id. at 704.
200. Western Wireless Corp., Petition for Preemption, File No. CWD 98-90 (July 20,
1998).
201. Id. at 13-14.
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Id. at 15-17.
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[s]ection 254 contains no grant to the Commission of direct regulatory
authority over intrastate matters. Consequently the basic presumption of
[s]ection [2(b)] against Commission assertion of jurisdiction applies. 2 °5
2. Applying the Three-Pronged Test
The Kansas Plan was selected because it is significantly different
from the Federal Plan. First, the Kansas Plan uses revenue neutrality to
determine the level of universal service support. Second, the Kansas Plan
provides statewide support to ILECs but denies statewide support to
CLECs. As illustrated below, in order for a state universal service plan to
be consistent with the 1996 Act, it must meet both prongs of the test, un-
less a court determines that section 2(b) applies to limit the preemptive
reach of section 254(f), exempting purely intrastate policies. In that case,
the "optional" third prong of the test would be applied in order to deter-
mine which aspects of the plan are purely intrastate, jurisdictionally mixed,
or purely interstate. In addition, purely intrastate portions of a state plan
would still need to survive a conflict preemption test. If a state universal
service plan cannot withstand such scrutiny, it is preempted by the 1996
Act.
Prong 1 of the test for determining inconsistencies with section
254(f) of the Act requires an express preemption analysis. This prong re-
quires that the state universal service plan be consistent with the express
language in section 254, including the requirement of consistency with the
FCC's rules for implementing universal service. °6 Several of the Kansas
Plan's policies stray from the FCC's rules and polices for implementing
the universal service provisions of the Act and as a result may be incon-
sistent with the FCC' s implementation of the universal service provision of
the Act.
As mentioned in Part IV, the FCC adopted seven design principles.
Several aspects of the Kansas Plan are at odds with these principles. Spe-
cifically, the Kansas Plan's reliance on revenue neutrality as a means for
sizing the KUSF and the limitation on statewide high-cost support for
CLECs are arguably inconsistent with several of these principles.
The FCC adopted the following universal service design principle:
There should be specific, predictable, and sufficient federal and state
207
mechanisms to preserve and enhance universal service. In conformingthe Federal Plan to this principle, the FCC decided to use a forward-
205. Western Wireless Corp., Comments of the Kansas State Corporation Commission,
File No. CWD 98-90, at 18 (Sept. 3, 1998) [hereinafter KCC Comments].
206. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
207. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 44.
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looking cost model to determine the level of high-cost support that will be
provided to nonrural carriers. A cost model, which uses company specific
information to develop inputs that approximate actual costs of an efficient
telephone network, ensures that the universal service support mechanism is
specific, predictable, and sufficient to preserve and enhance universal
service. The FCC encouraged states to adopt cost models by providing
guidelines for states to use when developing their cost models and permit-
ting states to use a state cost model, instead of the FCC's model, for de-
termining the level of federal universal service support to be funded by the
states.208
In contrast to both the design principle and the specific FCC-adopted
means of achieving a specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanism to
preserve and enhance universal service, the Kansas Plan does not employ a
cost model. Instead, the amount of support in the KUSF is based on the
principle of revenue neutrality. The amount in the fund is equal to the dif-
ference between interstate and intrastate access charges. Incumbent local
exchange carriers are entitled to recover from the KUSF losses resulting
from reduced intrastate access charges. Because the mechanism is not
based on the cost of providing basic telephone service to residents of Kan-
sas, the Kansas Plan is not specific, predictable, or sufficient.
Second, the Kansas Plan is inconsistent with the FCC's principle that
universal service mechanisms should be competitively neutral.20 The FCC
defines as competitively neutral those policies that "neither unfairly ad-
vantage or disadvantage one provider over another."210 The Kansas Plan
provides statewide universal service support to incumbent local exchange
carriers, which are able to tap the fund to recover their losses in intrastate
access charges.
Competitive carriers providing service in Kansas, however, are only
eligible for state universal service support for their exchanges with fewer
than 10,000 lines.211 Nonetheless, these carriers are required to contribute
to the fund in the same manner as incumbent local exchange carriers. In
essence, the CLECs, which are ineligible to receive statewide universal
service support, arguably subsidize incumbents because incumbents are
guaranteed revenue neutrality. The result unfairly advantages incumbents
in two ways: (1) incumbents are eligible for statewide support and com-
petitors are not; and (2) competitors subsidize the revenues guaranteed to
208. See generally Guidance to Proponents of Cost Models in Universal Service Pro-
ceeding: Customer Location and Outside Plant, Public Notice, 12 F.C.C.R. 18,340 (1997).
209. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 47.
210. Id.
211. 1996KCC Order, supra note 178, para. 123(b).
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incumbents. Arguably, the limitation on statewide support is not competi-
tively neutral and, as a result, is inconsistent with the FCC's rules for im-
plementing the universal service provisions of the Act. l2
In addition to the requirement that state universal service plans be
consistent with the FCC's rules for implementing universal service, the
state plan must also comply with the remaining express language of sec-
tion 254(f). These additional provisions include: (1) additional state defi-
nitions and requirements must be supported by a specific, predictable, and
sufficient mechanism, and (2) state mechanisms must not rely on or burden
the federal mechanism. The specific, predictable, and sufficient require-
ment is encapsulated in the FCC rules for implementing universal service.
As discussed above, the KUSF lacks a specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanism because the mechanism is not directly related to the cost of
providing basic service. However, the Kansas Plan is consistent with the
requirement that a state plan not burden or rely on the Federal Plan be-
cause the Kansas fund and distribution mechanism are completely unre-
lated to the federal universal service mechanism.
Because the Kansas Plan cannot pass muster under the first prong of
the test, further analysis is not required. However, for illustrative purposes,
the Kansas Plan is analyzed under prong 2, the standard conflict preemp-
tion test. Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with
state and federal law simultaneously or when a state law obstructs an im-
- • 213
portant objective of federal regulation. As discussed supra, if a state uni-
versal service regulation fails prong 1, the regulation also obstructs an im-
portant federal objective and consequently fails prong 2. For instance, the
policies of basing universal service support on revenue neutrality and lim-
iting statewide support to incumbents obstruct the federal objective stated
in section 254(f) of a mechanism that is "specific, predictable and suffi-
cient" to "enhance and preserve" universal service.
Prong 2 also requires that it be possible for a carrier to comply si-
multaneously with both state and federal universal service regulations.
With regard to Kansas, the relevant inquiry is whether a state universal
service plan can use revenue neutrality concepts to size its fund, while the
Federal Plan uses a cost model for purposes of sizing the Federal Universal
212. The KCC, in its comments to Western Wireless's Petition for Preemption of the
Kansas Universal Service Plan, argues that "as with any other anti-discriminatory principle,
different treatment is fair if it corresponds to differences in characteristics between provid-
ers." In sum, the KCC contends that the mandated rate cuts faced by incumbent local ex-
change carriers justifies the different treatment and does not provide them with an unfair
advantage over CLECs. KCC Comments, supra note 205.
213. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Service Fund. Without confusing the analysis, it is interesting to note that
section 254(f) addresses state universal service plans that provide support
in addition to the support carriers received from the Federal Plan. How-
ever, as discussed supra, the separation rules require that states provide 75
percent of the funding for the federal mechanism. 214 The FCC also permits
states to use their own cost models to determine the state portion of the
federal requirement. Clearly, Kansas could not use revenue neutrality to
determine universal service support with regard to its obligation to fund 75
percent when the FCC requires that the states use the federal cost model or
an FCC-approved state model. However, it is conceivable that Kansas
could use revenue neutrality to size the state universal service fund while
its federal support is determined using the FCC's cost model. Therefore,
although the Kansas revenue neutrality concept probably obstructs an im-
portant federal objective, in theory the policy could coexist with federal
regulations.
Although it is unlikely that a state or federal court will determine that
section 254(f)'s preemption power is limited by section 2(b), the three-
pronged test provides an optional third prong in anticipation of this remote
possibility. The first question to ask under this prong is whether the state
regulations at issue cover purely intrastate services. The third prong recog-
nizes that section 2(b) of the Act exempts from section 254(f) all state uni-
versal service regulations governing equipment used exclusively in intra-
state jurisdiction, services provided exclusively in the intrastate
jurisdiction, or charges for intrastate services.
Universal service programs ensure that all residents have access to
basic telephone services and therefore generally deal with purely intrastate
issues. However, interstate issues are implicated with respect to some as-
pects of a universal service plan. For instance, the definition of basic serv-
215ice includes access to a long-distance service provider. Furthermore, the
FCC adopted separation rules that allocate the cost of the local loop be-
tween the interstate and intrastate jurisdictions. These policies indicate that
some of the equipment used in the provision of basic service is
"jurisdictionally mixed."' Therefore, individual state universal service
214. As noted in Part IV, the FCC is investigating the 75% figure and is currently seek-
ing comment on the Joint Board's proposed modifications to the separations rules. See Uni-
versal Serv. Public Notice, supra note 119; Universal Serv. Second Recommended Decision,
supra note 119.
215. Universal Serv. Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 61.
216. With respect to interpreting section 2(b), jurisdictionally mixed equipment impli-
cates the impossibility exception if the state law conflicts with the FCC's lawful authority
over the intrastate jurisdiction. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. However, in
Iowa Utilities Board, the court indicated that the separation rules provide a means to allo-
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policies must be analyzed for consistency with section 2(b) to determine if
they are exempt from the preemptive effect of section 254(f)-even if at
first glance they appear to involve purely intrastate services.
The Kansas Plan's use of revenue neutrality as the guiding principle
to size its state universal service plan is arguably a purely intrastate policy.
Despite the fact that the KUSF supports access to interexchange services,
the Kansas Plan should not be automatically deemed outside the ambit of
section 2(b). Instead, a section 2(b) jurisdictionally mixed analysis should
be completed, guided by the case law as discussed in Part Ill. According to
the "impossibility exception," section 2(b) is negated when it is impossible
to separate interstate and intrastate components and when the state law
conflicts with the FCC's lawful authority over the interstate jurisdiction.
The reverse should also be true: A state universal service policy involving
jurisdictionally mixed services, equipment, or charges should be protected
by section 2(b) if it does not conflict with the FCC's lawful authority over
the interstate jurisdiction. Included within the FCC's lawful authority over
interstate services is its authority over the federal universal service mecha-
nism. Hence the question of whether section 2(b) protects the revenue
neutral mechanism of the Kansas Plan from preemption depends on
whether this policy conflicts with the Federal Plan. As discussed above,
such a policy undermines the federal objective of specific, predictable, and
sufficient mechanisms although the burden is on the FCC to prove this to a
court. Hence, this policy will not be exempted from preemption by the
third prong of the test. More importantly, this analysis confirms the hy-
pothesis in Part III that the "impossibility exception" turns on whether a
plan presents the type of conflict preemption in which a state law stands as
an obstacle to a federal law, and is thus preempted.217
In conclusion, the Kansas Plan's long history of challenges in its
relatively short life indicates its potential inconsistencies with the Federal
Plan. Applying the three-pronged test for determining inconsistencies with
section 254(f) of the 1996 Act confirms that the Kansas Plan should be
preempted by federal law.
cate between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions. See supra note 56 and accompanying
text. Thus, the mere application of the separation rules to universal service should not ren-
der it jurisdictionally mixed.
217. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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B. California
1. The California Universal Service Plan
California's commitment to preserving and enhancing universal
service predates the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In 1993, the Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) submitted a strategy report to
-
- . 218
the Governor regarding the state's telecommunications infrastructure.
The report, entitled Enhancing California's Competitive Strength: A Strat-
egy for Telecommunications Infrastructure, promoted competition in the
telecommunications market as the most effective way to keep pace with
219innovation and change in telecommunications. In 1994, the legislature
passed two bills. Assembly Bill 3606 opened all of California's telecom-
munications markets to local competition by January 1, 1997.2 0 Assembly
Bill 3643 required the CPUC to develop universal service policies to
"define the goals of universal service given new technologies and increas-
ingly competitive markets, with emphasis on the role of basic service in
education, health care, and in the workplace.22
The CPUC defines basic service as those telecommunications serv-
ices customers have come to expect, including access to single party local
exchange services; access to interchange carriers; ability to place and re-
ceive calls; touch-tone dialing; free access to emergency services; access
to directory assistance; Lifeline rates for eligible customers; customer
choice of flat or measure service (California high-cost fund A (CHCF-A)
entities are exempt from this requirement); access to directory listing; ac-
cess to operator services; voice grade connection to public switched net-
work; access to information services; one-time billing adjustment for
charges incurred inadvertently; free access to information about ULTS
(Lifeline); and free access to information regarding service activation,
termination, repair, and billing.2 All carriers providing residential serv-
ices are required to provide all of the elements of basic service.22 Local
218. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion into Competition
for Local Exchange Service, Order Granting a Limited Rehearing ofD.96-03-020 and
Modifying D.96-03-020, D.97-04-090, 1997 WL 373215, at *1 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 23, 1997).
219. Id.
220. Assembly Bill 3606, Stats. 1994, ch. 1260, § 3, CAL. PuB. UTn. CODE § 709.5
(West Supp. 1999) (directs the CPUC to ensure that the goals of universal service are met as
competition develops).
221. Mandates of Assembly Bill 3643, Opinion, D.96-10-066, 1996 WL 651546 (Cal.
P.U.C. Oct. 25, 1996) (describing the requirements of Assembly Bill 3643, Stats. 1994, ch.
278, § 2(a)).
222. Id. app. B, rule 4.A.-B.
223. Id. rule 4.A.
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exchange carriers are also required to actively pursue California's objec-
tive of achieving 95 percent subscribership among groups. 224
California has two high-cost funds. California high-cost fund A pro-
vides support for rural LECs; CHCF-B supports nonrural LECs. 25The
CPUC selected a cost model for CHCF-B, and the carriers have been as-
sessing the Commission-determined surcharge since February 1997.5 For
the most part, the surcharge is assessed on all telecommunications provid-
227ers, except one-way paging companies.
Instead of adopting the FCC's concept of a revenue benchmark, the
CPUC adopted a statewide cost benchmark for determining universal
service levels. Geographic serving areas qualify for high-cost support if
the cost providing basic local service exceeds the statewide cost of $20.30
or the carrier's flat rate plus the end-user common line charge, whichever
is greater. 228 The subsidy amount is funded by an all-end-user surcharge
estimated to 2.87 percent. 229 All surcharges must be itemized on customer
bills.
Incumbent local exchange carriers are required to adjust downward
the price of all services in an amount equal to the explicit subsidy received
from the CHCF-B. 30 To receive CHCF funding, a carrier must be a carrier
2311of last resort (COLR). Incumbent local exchange carriers are automati-
cally COLRs,3 2 and competing carriers may apply for COLR designa-
tion.23' A reseller receives universal service support if it purchases at mar-
ket-based or de-averaged prices. In all other cases, the initial provider of
the resold services receives the support.
The California Lifeline Program (ULTS) requires that all carriers
234providing basic service offer Lifeline. Carriers may not charge more than
the statewide ULTS rate to qualifying low-income customers and must
provide the service to all requesting customers.235 Carriers may recover the
difference between their tariffed rate and the Lifeline rate, but may not re-
cover an amount greater than that recovered by the incumbent serving the
224. Id. rule 3.B.3(a).
225. Id. Ordering paras. 8a, 9.
226. Id. Ordering para. 8h.
227. Id. Ordering para. 8g.
228. Id. Ordering para. 1Od.
229. Id. Ordering para. 8h.
230. Id. app. B, rule 6.C.3.
231. Id. rule 6.C.2.
232. Id. Ordering para. 7e (providing that all 22 ILECs in California are COLRs).
233. Id. Ordering para. 9.
234. Lifeline is included in the required basic service offerings. See id. app. B, rule 4.B.
235. Id.
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same geographic area. The ULTS subsidy is funded by a separate sur-
charge on all end-users of telecommunications.26 Competitive local carri-
ers are eligible to receive ULTS support.
The schools and libraries program is consolidated with the health
care program and both discounts are recovered from the California Tele-
connect Fund (CTF). The CTF is funded by a 0.41 percent surcharge on
customer bills.237 In addition to rules regarding CHCF-A, CHCF-B, CTF,
and ULTS, California adopted a series of consumer protection rules.23
2. Applying the Three-Pronged Test
The California Universal Service Plan (California Plan) has been se-
lected because it is significantly similar to the Federal Plan and, in some
regards more explicit and forward looking than the Federal Plan. First, the
California Plan expands the federal definition of basic service. Second, the
Plan creates a virtual voucher funding mechanism for CHCF-B, supple-
mented by an auction system. Third, the Plan ties CHCF-B support to
COLR designation. This analysis focuses on California's expanded defini-
tion of basic service.
To be consistent with the 1996 Act, the state plan must pass both
prongs of the test (unless a court determines that section 2(b) applies to
limit section 254(f)). If the state plan cannot pass one of the test's two re-
quired prongs, it will be vulnerable to preemption by the 1996 Act.
Prong 1 of the test for determining inconsistencies with section
254(f) of the Act is an express preemption analysis. This prong requires
that the state universal service plan be consistent with the express language
in section 254, including the requirement of consistency with the FCC
rules for implementing universal service. The California Plan is not only
"not inconsistent" with the Federal Plan, it actively advances the goals of
universal service.
As noted earlier, the California Plan significantly expands the federal
definition of basic service to incorporate services Californians have come
to rely on and expect. California expands the definition of basic services
without deleting any of the federally defined services. The California Plan
is not identical to the Federal Plan, but neither is it inconsistent with the
federal rules. The California Plan satisfies prong 1 of the test.
The California Plan's definition of basic service does not burden the
federal mechanism. Under section 254(f), the state is responsible for set-
236. Id. Ordering para. 7d.
237. Id. Ordering para. 10e.
238. See generally id. For example, the CPUC adopted a bilingual outreach program.
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ting up an intrastate plan that promotes universal service in a competitive
environment. The California plan does not stop at a one-time expansion of
the basic service definition, it includes a periodic review of its basic serv-
ice definition. Every three years the CPUC will consider whether even
further expansion of the listed services is warranted in order to continually
provide the greatest possible range of telecommunications services to all
Californians. This is an even more progressive approach to preserving and
advancing universal service than is required by the federal rules.
Prong 2 of the test is a conflict preemption analysis; it requires that it
be possible to comply simultaneously with both the federal and state uni-
versal service regulations. As noted above, the California Universal Serv-
ice Plan includes an expanded definition of basic service from that of the
FCC. These two sets of regulations can exist contemporaneously as there
is no added burden placed on federal universal service, and this "in addi-
tion to" requirement serves to preserve and advance universal service.
Because the California Plan incorporates more into basic service than
the federal regulations require, there is an inconsistency between the two.
However, this is an inconsistency created by California's intrastate com-
ponents, which are in addition to the federal regulations. This "in addition
to" language is consistent with section 254(f), which allows states to adopt
additional definitions to preserve and advance universal service. In this in-
stance, both sets of regulations can be complied with simultaneously,
thereby rendering this particular inconsistency outside of 254(f)'s preemp-
tive reach. Further, the California Plan's expanded list of basic service
supports the federal objective of enhancing and advancing universal serv-
ice rather than obstructing this important federal objective. Therefore,
California's Plan meets the requirements for prong 2.
Prong 3 is the optional prong to the preemption test. This prong is vi-
able if a state or federal court concludes that section 254(f)'s preemption
power is limited by section 2(b). When there are mixed jurisdiction con-
siderations or the equipment used, services rendered, or charges made are
purely intrastate, section 2(b) stands between 254(f) and preemption of
state regulations.
Most of the services included on California's expanded basic service
list fall within the purely intrastate exemption. However, the list does in-
clude access to interexchange carriers and access to information services
and 1-800 numbers. These two services probably qualify as jurisdictionally
mixed as they consist of a combination of interstate and intrastate compo-
nents.
Just because services are jurisdictionally mixed does not immediately
open a state plan to 254(f)'s preemption power. As discussed earlier, case
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law had defined the "impossibility exception." This exception negates sec-
tion 2(b) when it is impossible to separate interstate and intrastate compo-
nents and when the state law conflicts with the FCC's lawful authority
over the interstate jurisdiction. If it is impossible to separate the interstate
and intrastate components of interexchange carriers and information serv-
ices to include 1-800, then preemption will hinge on whether California's
expanded version of basic service conflicts with the FCC's lawful author-
ity over the interstate jurisdiction. As previously discussed, the expansion
of basic services does not undermine federal objectives. In fact, it goes be-
yond the federal requirement in promoting federal objectives. Hence, this
policy should be exempted from preemption by the third prong of the test.
In conclusion, the California Universal Service Plan shows a pattern
of being both consistent with the Federal Universal Service Plan and going
beyond the federal mandate to preserve and advance universal service. The
application of the test for determining inconsistencies with section 254(f)
of the 1996 Act leads to the conclusion that federal law should not preempt
the California Plan.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress
revamped federal universal service policy by requiring that universal serv-
ice support be explicit. With the introduction of competition in the local
market, the requirement that universal service support be explicit ensures
that both high and low-cost areas will have reasonably comparable access
to telecommunications services, without impairing the ability of carriers to
price telecommunications services on a competitive basis.
Universal service policy provides a compelling framework to exam-
ine legal issues because it embodies the greatest paradox contained in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996-introducing unbridled competition
while at the same time preserving access to quality telecommunications
services in "less attractive" market segments. To achieve this goal in a
manner that satisfies varying local, regional, and national interests, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides for both a mandatory federal
universal service fund and permissive state universal service funds. It is
therefore important to determine the amount of flexibility individual states
are permitted under the Act to develop universal service funding plans that
comport with local interests without frustrating national objectives.
Congress provided that states could supplement federal universal
service support with state universal service support only if the state pro-
gram is not inconsistent with the FCC's rules for implementing the Federal
Plan. In adopting this section of the Act, Congress expressly provided for
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preemption of state universal service plans that are not consistent with the
FCC's rules. In doing so, Congress removed state universal service plans
from the ambit of section 2(b), which limits the FCC's jurisdiction over
state charges, rates, and services. Therefore, the FCC's rules for imple-
menting universal service are the determining factor in whether a state
universal service plan can withstand judicial or FCC challenge.
Section 254(f) provides for express preemption of state universal
service plans but uses FCC rules as a measure for determining when pre-
emption is required. As a result, the case law governing express preemp-
tion by Congress is in and of itself an insufficient guide for determining
the scope of the section 254(f) preemption power. To interpret section
254(f), case law governing preemption by the FCC of state law must also
be incorporated. Thus, a three-pronged test is required to determine
whether a state universal service plan is preempted by section 254(f). First,
a state plan must be consistent with the FCC's rules and must not burden
the federal mechanism. Second, a state plan must be able to coexist with
each policy adopted by the Federal Universal Service Plan. Additionally, if
a court insists that section 2(b) applies to section 254(f), a third prong is
required-state laws concerning purely intrastate services, equipment, and
charges are immune from FCC preemption.
The test for determining whether state universal service plans are in-
consistent with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 yields predictable re-
sults. California, a state known for its pro-consumer laws and its progres-
sive telecommunications policies, has a universal service plan that easily
passes the test. On the other hand, Kansas, a state with many rural areas
and a public utility commission pressured by incumbents to quash local
competition, adopted a state universal service plan that does not pass the
test.
Finally, the test created herein is not a new test applied to new law,
but instead, a method to ensure consistent application of preemption juris-
prudence to the evolution of the Communications Act of 1934. Clearly, the
FCC's power to preempt state law should not increase or decrease de-
pending on which section of the Communications Act is being challenged
by a state law. Instead, all sections of the Communications Act that pro-
vide the FCC with power to preempt state law should be governed by the
same body of case law. The test for determining whether state universal
service plans are inconsistent with the Act is grounded in the principles set
out in Louisiana PSC, which has been consistently applied by appeals
courts and was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court in AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board.
Although the test for determining whether state universal service
plans are inconsistent with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was de-
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vised with the universal service provisions of the Act in mind, its use is not
so limited. This test should provide a framework for determining whether
state law is preempted by any section of the Communications Act of 1934.

